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“Daher fordert die Philosophie: standig 
Kommunikation suchen, sie rückhaltlos wagen, meine 
trotzige, sich in immer anderen Verkleidungen 
aufzwingende Selbstbehauptung hingeben, in der 
Hoffnung leben, dass ich mir unberechenbar 
wiedergeschenkt werde aus der Hingabe.” (Karl 
Jaspers)
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Introduction. The topic of human communication has, in implicit or also sometimes more explicit 
ways, been central to philosophy practically since its beginning. From the dialogical and open nature 
of philosophy as the dialectical praxis it was for Socrates, to contemporary questions over the nature 
of intersubjectivity, of power and discourse, and attempts to base a theory of rationality on the 
parameters of communicative interaction, the event of speaking with each other, finding words to 
say what is, has been in many ways the heart of philosophy. Communication is firstly and mostly 
dialogue.  Indeed, the “wonder in the face of the world “ (E. Fink; PP, xiii), the archè (origin, medium 
and end) of philosophical thinking, is itself, far from being a mute, lonely affair between me and an 
overpowering but silent reality, an experience of meaning, an experience of the world as having 
something to say to us – here, in the primordial metaphysical experience, the sublime and the 
beautiful have not (yet) diverged, and the anguish felt (and Wittgenstein said there comes a point in 
philosophy where all we can do is scream) is only that of the difficulty of finding the words to speak 
in the face in the world – to respond to its words, which need our response to be heard, and to be 
heard in their groundless upsurge. As Merleau-Ponty said, my thoughts require words to become 
what they are – words are not the clothes of thought, but its body. And we can add: there is no 
listening without speaking and no speaking without listening. In this way we might express, 
preliminary and in a way that will need to be substantially elaborated, the reciprocal, dialogical 
nature of our being with others  and with the world, a nature philosophy strives to bring into view 
and to consciousness. Dialogue is not external to what is being spoken of, and dialogue is not 
external to our relation to others and to the world. Dialogue is not external to philosophy – dialogue 
is philosophy, and with the essence of dialogue the essence of philosophy – of our awareness and 
understanding of truth and reality, if I may put it like this for a moment – is given.  We conduct a 
dialogue, but a dialogue also conducts, or leads, us, and will change me when I am open to the 
possibility of its occurrence, which I can never entirely plan or bring about willingly. Philosophy is the 
hope that, when I give myself up, I will be given myself back, in an incalculable way. 
These are broad brush-strokes, mere colours on an empty canvas, as all meaning ‘schlechthin 
behauptend wie ein Orgelton’ (Ernst Bloch). I want to bring them into a unity which will hopefully 
allow me to articulate their meaning  more fully – realising that no articulation can ever be finished; 
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 Karl Jaspers in an address to the Collegium Studiosorum ‘Veritas’, Utrecht. Quoted by W. Luijpen, p. 8.  
but this is an insight that requires the elaboration in question. I want to reason about them, ‘bring 
truth into being’ (PP xx). 
Why phenomenology? The present methodological landscape in philosophy is peculiar. When we are 
looking for a way to begin to think, when we are looking for a method to embrace when we want to 
think about dialogue as philosophy and philosophy as dialogue, we are confronted with a plurality of 
options, of choices. To a certain extent this may always have been the case, but it strikes me that 
today there is a level of eclecticism, of choice having penetrated right to the heart of the traditions 
which before long exercised such a strong grip on those whose philosophical education had taken 
place in them. We relate to our traditions in the style of choice. We can’t say where this 
development will lead, but we can – and must – interpret it in many different ways. There is an 
economic , a cultural, a theoretical, a purely philosophical account to be given. For me, I was 
confronted with this choice after the formal, or perhaps speculative, notion of philosophy as 
communication had already taken hold in my mind. As Merleau-Ponty remarks (PP 172): ‘The act of 
the artist or the philosopher is free, but not motiveless. Their freedom resides in the power of 
equivocation (...); it consists in appropriating a de facto situation by endowing it with a figurative 
meaning beyond its real one.’ Thus, Marx conceived his situation as that of a middle class intellectual 
in the class struggle, rather than (just) that of the philosophy student and son of a lawyer. It seems 
to me that this inventio at the base of philosophy is itself already a response – a creative act at the 
basis of philosophy, even if the philosopher conceives his destiny as that of a contemplative 
acceptance of the real or of its symbolisations. I have to take up my life, I have to bring truth into 
being, and there is an irreducible aspect of creativity in this. We must be careful: the creative 
inventio is not a story I tell about myself, a costume I put on (as in certain late-twentieth century 
readings of Nietzsche) – it is logon didonai – the giving of a voice and an account, rationality as 
‘proportioned to the experiences in which it is disclosed’ (PP xix). The difference between the two 
lies precisely in the monological story and the dialogical giving of an account. We seek a response, 
and we seek truth as the precarious upsurge of meaning in the giving and receiving of responses. But 
– and this seems crucial to me to emphasise today – a philosophical life is a life of engagement, also 
with a philosophy. Philosophy’s universality needs a particularisation of identification on the part of 
the thinker. Today  - and it seems to me that this is new - this requirement presents itself as choice, 
and every choice happens also in the name of what was not chosen.  Our sense of tradition, indeed 
our appreciation of the necessity of having a tradition, a climate, a style (and Merleau-Ponty is quite 
explicity in this regard) to help us have our philosophies, like our languages, as a mode of inhabiting 
the world, is there, but is no longer naive. Faithfulness to the future of our traditions has replaced 
faithfulness to its origins. 
Now we can make a beginning, and say that the philosophy of communication is an existential 
phenomenology of communication.  We will analyse the phenomenological reduction, the eidetic 
reduction and intentionality – the three aspects of phenomenology Merleau-Ponty deals with in the 
Preface to PP – to show that a philosophy of communication has to be a phenomenology of 
communication.  
The phenomenological reduction. It is only by performing the phenomenological reduction that we 
can come to see what communication is. At the same time, the reduction is what happens in all 
genuine communication. The reduction is not so much the transcendental condition of possibility of 
communication, but its essence. We can communicate only if we inhabit a distance between us and 
our world: the world is there for me, I am in commununion with it, but I do not possess it, it is 
inexhaustible. What holds for the world, also hold for the meaning of which the world is the 
incarnation, it is en-soi-pour-nous, it remains elusive and is given to us precisely because of, and by, 
that elusiveness. A withdrawal from the natürliche Einstellung in order to understand and heed it is 
what happens in dialogue. ‘When I return to myself from an excursion into the realm of dogmatic 
common sense or of science, I find, not a source of intrinsic truth, but a subject destined to the 
world’ (PP xi) – and we may add: destined to others (the reduction is essentially communicable). At 
the same time, Merleau-Ponty emphasises that the reduction is never complete.  We are in the 
world, we reflect within the temporal flux we are trying to seize, and so there is no thought which 
embraces all thought (PP xiv); philosophy must always begin again, it is nothing else than the 
willingness to always begin again (to take another turn, as in conversations we constantly take 
turns). 
For Husserl the phenomenological reduction is a procedure we can carry out to lay bare a field of 
experience which acts as a transcendental plane on which our knowledge of our normal 
environment and our scientific knowledge is built up. The phenomenological reduction at once 
assigns philosophy a well-defined place in the building of knowledge and it gives it its ‘Arbeitsfeld’, 
its area of work. The reduction, the placing between brackets of causality, of objectification and of 
the lifeworld and looking at them without following our natural inclination to take these things as 
independent reality opens up to us the interdependency and psychologically and naturalistically 
irreducible relation between consciousness and world. The transcendental plane is anonymous – it 
exists in the same way for ego and alter, and makes a shared world with empirical subjects within it 
possible. It brings to view the structure of the relations between subject and object, between self 
and world, and it does this by analysing the immediate given in phenomenological apprehension. In 
this way, Husserl attempts three things: to give philosophy a sound scientific basis; to rescue a 
philosophical, at once general and formal conception of reason (which for him is of great value in 
rescuing the project of modernity in the face of relativism) and to explain the natural link between 
lifeworld and the theories of the (natural) sciences. Merleau-Ponty, in his preface to PP, explains 
that Husserl’s reduction is a transcendental idealism, for which intersubjectivity presents no problem 
since the subject co-constitutive of the subject-meaning correlation that obtains between self and 
world is a completely generalised subjectivity.  It is important to understand that the Husserlian 
Cogito, although transcendental and maybe even idealist, is not solipsist – for Husserl as much as for 
Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty, there is no question how the contents of consciousness can represent 
“reality” – the nature of consciousness is to-be-with-the-world. Certainly, for Husserl this is a 
relation of giving meaning – Sinngebung
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 – which already Heidegger would question (and which later 
phenomenologists have time and again questioned), but by this implicit activity (the background 
fungierende Intentionalität) a world is constituted, not a representation of it. It is precisely in the 
phenomenological reduction that we become able to see this peculiar co-determination of self and 
world. All of this Merleau-Ponty takes over. The difference with Husserl consists in the fact that for 
Merleau-Ponty the reduction is not transcendental but existential. What does this mean? 
Thetranscendental reduction allows us access to the level of experience that precedes and makes 
possible the lifeworld with its various regional ontologies, as much as the specialised ontologies of 
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 ‘In gewisser Art und mit einiger Vorsicht im Wortgebrauche kann man auch sagen: “Alle realen Einheiten sind 
‘Einheiten des Sinnes’. Sinneseinheiten setzen sinngebendes Bewusstsein voraus, das seinerseits absolut und 
nicht selbst wieder durch Sinngebung ist.’ (Ideen, par. 55) 
science. In a round-about way it also solves the problem of other minds. But it does so at a cost. 
Thesubjectivity it reaches is not my subjectivity, the lifeworld it speaks of it is not the world of my 
life. The reduction, Husserl said, is never complete – the flow of life always catches up with us, I 
cannot reflect myself absolutely out of the world. The anxious attempt to do this, to reach the 
vantage point from which I am the transcendental cogito, would require a complete transparency in 
my self-mediation, it would require the collapse of all mediatedness, but this is never possible 
precisely because my access to the transcendental plane is always and constantly via the thinker I 
am. The phenomenological reduction throws me back upon myself, to find myself geared at a world 
which transcends me and to which I nevertheless belong; it shows me that all reflection is rooted in 
an pre-reflexive, irreflexive, brute factuality within which I as a human being emerge, and with me 
the world. My irreflexive experience of the world is paralleled in the phenomenological reduction by 
eidetic experience. The eidetic, the general formality of experience, is, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, 
the attempt of reflection to think irreflexive consciousness’ dwelling with the world. Wonder in the 
face of the world – a sense of its mystery and paradox and its inexhaustible nature – is the entry to 
the phenomenological gaze. The reduction, as in Husserl, is something we can inhabit and come to 
live in. Philosophy is the attempt to do this. We discover, as did Husserl, that common sense and 
science are dogmatisms built up on an originary level of experience, of being with ourselves and 
being with the world, which the philosopher can only describe, indicate, remind us of – it can’t be 
explained or analysed as it is presupposed in all explanatory and analytical procedures. Philosophy is 
not so much the production of knowledge as the safeguarding of the awareness of the source of all 
knowledge.  The reduction in Merleau-Ponty does not hurl us out of the world; rather, it 
reconstitutes my living relation with, in, the world – it is the ‘bringing of truth into being’,  the 
precarious balance of finding back my engagement with myself, others and with the world, which I 
never lost but which may have become anonymous, and looking at my commitments ohne 
mitzumachen, in order to realise that I am always already committed and (as we shall see later) in 
order to be able to give expression to my commitments.  Philosophy is situated, the reduction is 
situated and truth is situated.
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 Experience of others is for Merleau-Ponty a crucial factor in the 
development from a transcendental to an existential conception of the reduction. Husserl had used 
an essentially anonymous transcendental plane on which the problem of the other did not arise. For 
Merleau-Ponty the reduction more than anything else makes it clear that I am essentially related to 
others. My existence as embodied implies  essentially that another can see or experience me. It is 
important to understand here that the experience of someone else of my body is an experience of 
me – my outside is not detached from me, but it is me externally. My partner experiences my joy, 
my moodiness, my affection or dislike. We have an outer appearance: ‘He must and I must have an 
outer appearance, and there must be, besides the perspective of the For Oneself – my view of 
myself and the other’s of himself- a perspective For Others – my view of others and theirs of me. Of 
course, these two perspectives, in each one of us, cannot be simply juxtaposed, for in that case it is 
not I that the other would see, nor he that I should see. I must be the exterior I present to others, and 
the body of the other must be the other himself’; ‘at the very moment when I experience my 
existence – at the ultimate extremity of reflection – I fall short of the ultimate density which would 
place me outside time’ (PP xii). It is in philosophical reflection that I come to see my irreflexive life 
for what it is and it is also in reflection that I come to see what my relations to others really are. The 
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 As such it is, however, called for. Philosophy is not a duty, living a human life is not a duty, but it is called for. 
We can only ignore philosophy, we can’t dismiss it. Cf. In Praise of Philosophy, where Merleau-Ponty 
equivocates the situation of the philosopher in his time with Socratic practice to bring truth into being. 
extreme of reflection is affirmed and broken up by my realisation that I am a human being among 
human beings, and that I am exposed to others, and to you. Even if I return to common sense or 
science, I will experience these better and deeper because of my reflection. In a way, Merleau-Ponty 
re-interprets the delphian maxim – know thyself-, and in a changed context reserves for philosophy 
a very classical place, as that possibility of existence that makes us human and gives us the world 
and truth – but categorically rather than as content. Philosophy is a philosophical life for Merleau-
Ponty. What my commitments are, what my engagements are, what I do with my found freedom – 
these questions have to be answered by living my life. In philosophy I learn to see the world rightly. I 
do not, as Wittgenstein suggested, throw away the ladder on which I climbed to get the right view. 
As we said, philosophy always has to begin again, it is never done. This contrast, again, can be 
expressed in terms of monologue and dialogue. 
Communication as intersubjectivity leads Merleau-Ponty to his reformulation of the 
phenomenological reduction.  In it, perhaps, we see a pre-figuring of the later ideas of 
Visible/Invisible, the Flesh and the Chiasm. It seems to me that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy still 
provides highly valuable insights and ideas that we can appropriate in an attempt to develop a 
manner of thinking about what happens when we speak which is able to express an integral 
experience of the reality of interaction and dialogue preceding that of common sense and 
communication theory and research. This methodological perspective is at the moment the most 
important for me; with it stands or falls the value of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy for the concerns of 
us, today. 
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty’s presence in contemporary phenomenology is notable. If we accept 
the three “Urphenomene” which Tengelyi has identified in French phenomenology – processes of 
meaning formation; experience of the body; the event of address (Sinnbildungsvorgang, 
Leiberfahrung, Anspruchsereignis) and the constellation of a school emphasising the dimension of 
the gift in reduction and intentionality on one hand (Marion) and one emphasising the sublime 
infinite abyss we uncover underneath all meaning formation in symbol and language on the other 
(Richir), we can easily see that the work done by Merleau-Ponty on the relation between 
communication and the phenomenological reduction still deserve close attention. 
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